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Abstract
The media has an important role in reporting transport news, but it can also engage in
transport advocacy and shape transport policy and planning. In 2009, The Sydney Morning
Herald newspaper launched an independent inquiry to develop a long term public transport
plan for Sydney, with 500 page preliminary and final reports released in 2010 after
community consultation including public meetings and submissions. Most members of the
Inquiry team, transport professionals, donated their time to the Inquiry. The paper examines
the campaign by The Sydney Morning Herald to develop a long term public transport plan for
Sydney, independent of the NSW state government. It reviews the who, what, how, and why
of the campaign. It analyses the impact and influence of the campaign in terms of the
contribution to content in the newspaper and impact on government transport policy. The
campaign is positioned in the context of civic engagement and social capital, as well as
policy transfer. The paper finds that the Herald did not make as full a use of its sponsored
Inquiry as it could have, suggesting dual reasons for the campaign of both content
generation and readership, and civic engagement and social capital building.

1. Introduction
Many stakeholders use the media in their lobbying and advocacy efforts, such as
disseminating surveys and research reports through media, and the media itself engages in
political advocacy, such as editorials to influence voters’ decisions in elections. But there
appear to be few, if any, examples where a media outlet conducts extensive communitybased research to build up knowledge in an area rather than focusing on reporting and
dissemination. There are also relatively few examples of media actively engaged in transport
advocacy and gap-filling in the government activities of this particular policy area.
This paper examines a case where a government-created policy weakness elicited a
response from a leading civic institution to engage the community and activate part of the
policy network in the area of transport policy. The unique element of this case is the role that
a newspaper, The Sydney Morning Herald, has played in the debate about public transport in
Sydney. The Herald sponsored a high-level transport consultation, engaging widely with
stakeholders and policy experts, then issued a comprehensive and extensively distributed
long term plan for public transport in Sydney. The paper finds that the Herald did not make as
full a use of its own study as it could have. It is argued that one reason for this is that the
exercise was not solely about readership building and opinion-leading but also about civic
engagement and social capital building. The Herald Inquiry’s process was as important as its
product, the process being integral to building a policy network that might not yield immediate
policy results (and indeed was limited in doing so by government dysfunction) but which
might yield civic and policy returns in future when conditions were more favourable to
implementation.
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The paper is structured as follows: section 2 reviews the literature, section 3 describes the
strategic context for the Herald’s Inquiry, section 4 describes the Inquiry, section 5 assesses
the impact and influence of the Inquiry, and section 6 discusses conclusions and implications
for civic engagement, social capital and policy transfer.

2. Literature review
2.1 Civic engagement, social capital and policy transfer
How do policy plans and ideas get formed, disseminated, sorted through and ultimately
implemented? What institutions play roles in these various stages and how do they play
those roles? These are the basic questions of the policy transfer literature which is a
foundation of the social capital, policy network and civic engagement concepts employed in
analysing the Herald’s Inquiry.
The term ‘policy transfer’ is a relatively fluid term. Policy transfer is defined in an authoritative
source as “the process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements,
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system”
(Dolowitz 2000, p. 3; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, p. 5). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p. 344)
note that the term can also be referred to as “emulation and lesson drawing”.
‘Transfer’ suggests the movement of something from one place, person or institution to
another. Transfer of policy contains a complex set of ends and means. Policy transfer initially
focused on government-to-government networks but has broadened out to consider the role
of NGOs, of international institutions, of think-tanks, and of advocacy and professional
groups amongst others, formulating and spreading policies and their adoption (Shipan and
Volden 2008). Wolman and Page (2002, p. 477) have conceptualised policy transfer “as
occurring through a communications and information framework” with a “focus on information
networks that include producers, senders, and facilitators of information, as well as
recipients”.
One ultimate outcome of a policy network and policy transfer is the creation of ‘social capital’.
Bourdieu (1986, p. 248) defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or potential
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”. The ‘returns’ to social
capital might be private (i.e. limited to the members of a particular network) but they also
might result in a social ‘externality’ in which the overall society gains in some way from a
capital base which was invested in by only some members of that society.
An influential successor to Bordieu’s social capital conception is provided by Robert Putnam
who defines the term as referring to ‘features of social organization such as networks, norms,
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam 1997,
p. 31). Putnam’s social capital theory operates in a framework where individual human
behaviour is rational but where there can be group or network effects that are more than the
sum of the parts of individual decisions and actions in isolation (Putnam 1995, 2000). Like
other forms of capital, social capital has long term payoffs, and investments in social capital
stock need to be at levels sufficient to ensure that society gets the requisite returns.
Two critical questions are (1) what leads to accumulation and decumulation of social capital?
And (2) how does social capital work to generate social returns? There seem to be two basic
inputs to the building of social capital. First, individuals need to be adequately educated and
motivated, and to be able to participate usefully in the networks that underlie social capital.
Second, the existence and nature of these networks is critical to ensuring that social capital
is generated and maintained (Putnam 2000, Halpern 2001).
As for how social capital generates returns, social trust is said to be a critical outcome. Social
engagement is another critical outcome (Woolcock 2001, Cote and Healy 2001). Together
these two elements serve to improve economic efficiency through the lowering of
2
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transactions costs (informal trust replaces more costly formal enforcement mechanisms);
increase public accountability through a more informed and active electorate; and increase
the amount of positive collective activity (Putnam 2000). Some point out a negative ‘sanction’
dynamic as well, i.e. that the positive social norms generated by social capital can be
informally enforced by the underlying social networks (Halpern 2001).

2.2 Role of media
Interestingly, amongst all the various actors and networks that the literatures cited above
consider, the media figures very little. The implicit premise of much of the social capital and
policy transfer literature seems to be that the principals engaged in the relevant networks are
too sophisticated to see media coverage as having much utility for their higher-level
purposes. The media is implicitly treated as a background conduit, to be utilised by network
members, but not as interested and involved parties themselves. To borrow from Wolman
and Page’s (2002) schema, the media are mostly ‘facilitators’ of data flow not ‘producers’,
‘senders’ or ‘recipients’.
Media institutions play a role in policy transfer and formulation. Whether intentional or not,
the media influences public opinion on a wide range of issues by what is published, what is
not, and the priority given to different issues. Vigar et al. (2011) reported on selling
sustainable mobility through the reporting of the Manchester Transport Innovation Fund bid in
UK media while Salomon and Singer (2011) reviewed the role of transportation cartoons in
social experiences. In California, the Los Angeles Times developed a simple internet game,
the LA Times California Budget Balancer game (LA Times 2010), to encourage the
community to explore how they would balance the state’s budget by cutting expenditure and
raising revenue. Bray et al. (2011) mention media implicitly when they refer to government’s
attempt to communicate its transport ideas to the public. Wolman and Page (2002) have a
theory focused on how that communication works, an area in which media institutions are
central. But the case considered here goes beyond media as a transmitter or receiver of
information. This is also associated with the idea of the media needing to position themselves
as pillars of society, campaigning on behalf of the common good.
We argue that The Sydney Morning Herald’s chosen form of engagement in Sydney's
transport debate is interesting because a media outlet actively invested in engaging the
community including a policy network of professionals to produce a new piece of ‘knowledge’
(the Inquiry Report itself) rather than rely on a more traditional output of media reporting.

3. Strategic context for the Inquiry: government policy vacuum
In a recent review of Australian policy-making in transport, Bray et al. (2011, p. 528) argue
that government takes a central role. Sometimes this role is active, sometimes more passive,
but in all cases the State is in the centre of policy formulation, transfer and ultimately
implementation. Transport planning is an archetypal government function. However, in
Sydney, NSW in the past decade there has been significant transport policy thinking,
formulation and dissemination occurring outside the government.

3.1 Non-government role in transport planning
The Sydney Morning Herald-sponsored transport plan was not the first non-government
sector involvement in strategic transport planning for Sydney. The Herald’s Inquiry built on
previous work by the NRMA, Warren Centre and 10,000 Friends for Greater Sydney, and
also on its own earlier Campaign for Sydney in 2005 (SMH 2005).
In 1995, the NRMA, a not-for-profit service association for motorists with over 2 million
members, launched the Clean Air 2000 campaign to reduce air pollution from transport. It set
up an Advisory Taskforce, and produced reports in 1998 in the lead up to the 1999 state
election.
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In 1999, the Warren Centre for Advanced Engineering at the University of Sydney initiated a
sustainable transport project which was a not-for-profit collaboration involving over 200
transport professionals in Sydney over several years. The dissemination of the project’s set
of comprehensive Sustainable Transport for Sustainable Cities reports (Warren Centre 2002)
was somewhat limited as it was not easily available electronically. The Warren Centre’s
project evolved into the 10,000 Friends for Greater Sydney not-for-profit group which has
largely focused on transport issues, involving some of the transport professionals who
worked on the Sustainable Transport project. 10,000 Friends released a Sydney Integrated
Transport Strategy (10,000 Friends 2007) and have held public forums to focus on regional
transport issues, with reports from these forums and other policy documents publicly
available (10,000 Friends 2011). Other transport plans include the 30 year transport plan for
Sydney developed by academic Dr Garry Glazebrook (Glazebrook 2009).
This wellspring of community activity suggests an active non-State policy network. But it also
indicates a weakness or vacuum created by government inconsistency and lassitude in
transport policy. Transport is an activity central to most parts of the wider society. Lack of
action and coherent thinking on policy in transport may have encouraged various
constituencies to act in lieu of government, culminating in the Herald Inquiry.

3.2 Immediate context for the Inquiry
The broader strategic context for the Inquiry in 2009 included the poor transport delivery
record of the NSW state government, as well as the views of other stakeholders including the
federal government, local government and the community towards transport planning in
NSW. The NSW government does have a transport policy with a stated commitment to public
transport. There was much government policy initiative, with transport plans released, but
poor follow-through on delivery. This situation created the impetus for the Herald to step in
and bring together elements of the community in a policy network to put forward a new
transport policy and plan.
NSW Government
Despite a series of strategic planning documents which supported integrated transport and
land use planning and supported public transport with nominated projects (NSW Government
2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2010a, 2010b), the NSW Government’s delivery of transport projects
had been disrupted by discontinuity in governance. Daniels (2011) outlined the impact of
discontinuity in governance, caused by changes in NSW Premiers, Ministers for Transport
and bureaucratic structures, on transport planning and delivery particularly on the North West
Rail Link.
In June 2009, Premier Rees announced “a new super-agency NSW Transport and
Infrastructure would take control of all transport and roads coordination, policy and planning
functions” (Rees 2009). One of the three immediate priorities was cited as developing a
Transport Blueprint that integrates urban growth and transport delivery. Less than six months
later, Nathan Rees was replaced as NSW Premier by Kristina Keneally on 4 December 2009.
The Sydney Metropolitan Herald reported in great detail on the comprehensive Transport
Blueprint Premier Rees had been due to release the day before his overthrow (West 2009a,
2009b). Premier Keneally’s replacement for the Transport Blueprint, the Metropolitan
Transport Plan: Connecting the City of Cities (NSW Government 2010b), was released in
February 2010, two weeks after the Inquiry’s Preliminary Report.
Australian federal government
In the May 2009 federal budget when the Federal Government announced its first round of
Nation Building funding for public transport infrastructure, NSW received only $91 million for
continuing planning of the West Metro from the CBD to Parramatta. The Federal Government
has been critical of NSW transport planning, with Saulwick and Besser (2011) reporting that

4

Mass media and mass transit: a newspaper’s campaign on public transport planning in Sydney

freedom-of-information sourced documents show that since 2008, NSW has failed to meet
Infrastructure Australia’s planning standards time and again.
Local government
The City of Sydney Council had been negotiating for many years with the NSW government
over transport plans for the city. The Council’s strategic plan Sustainable Sydney 2030
released in 2008 (City of Sydney 2008) had a vision of a city with connected and accessible
public transport. The Council supported light rail through the city as a solution to congestion
and growth problems, but light rail was not in NSW government plans. In 2009, the Mayor
appealed directly to the Prime Minister for federal funding for light rail.
Community and other stakeholders
In the lead-up to and during the Herald’s Inquiry, there was growing dissatisfaction amongst
community, professional and industry stakeholders over the NSW government’s transport
planning discontinuity (Daniels 2011). The community was disillusioned with the state
government in general, evident from opinion polls on voting intentions, and on transport in
particular, as shown in the poor expectations by NSW residents for transport in the quarterly
ITLS-Interfleet Transport Opinion Survey (ITLS 2010). Professional associations such as the
Planning Institute of Australia were critical of the government’s transport plans for metro rail
(PIA 2008). The Property Council of Australia’s representative publicly resigned from the
(defunct) Transport Blueprint Reference Panel in March 2010 when the replacement
Metropolitan Transport Plan fell a long way short of what the industry was seeking (Property
Council 2010).

4. The Herald Inquiry
The Inquiry is described in terms of what, why, who, and how.
4.1 What
On 22 August 2009, The Sydney Morning Herald announced that it was establishing its own
Independent Public Inquiry, chaired by Mr Ron Christie AM and assisted by independent
experts, to create the Long Term Public Transport Plan for Sydney. The public terms of
reference stated that “The Independent Public Inquiry will create a Long Term Public
Transport Plan for Sydney after receiving public submissions”, and that “The plan is to be
designed to assist both the public and future governments to make informed decisions about
priorities for transport investment” (Independent Inquiry 2010a).
The aim was to inform decisions by future governments on the priorities over the next 30
years (SMH 2009). It was intended a preliminary plan would be released in December 2009
for comment and a final report in autumn 2010. The Inquiry had its own website
www.transportpublicinquiry.com.au, separate from the Herald website, with reference
material including a 30 year public transport plan for Sydney (Glazebrook 2009), the Christie
Long-term Strategic Plan for Rail (DIPNR et al. 2003), and the NSW Government’s
Metropolitan Strategy (NSW Government 2005).
The Inquiry itself noted that “In Australia public inquiries without any government sponsorship
or control are conducted only in very unusual circumstances. More specifically, it is rare,
indeed, for an inquiry into public transport in Sydney to be able to carry out its investigations
and reach its conclusions with complete freedom and independence” (Independent Inquiry
2010b, p. 1).
The Inquiry’s Preliminary Report was publicly released on 13 February 2010, and the Final
Report was released on 31 May 2010.
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4.2 Why
The motivation of the Herald to establish and sponsor the Inquiry includes stated and
unstated reasons. In its page 1 announcement of the Inquiry, the Herald indicated that the
reasons for the Inquiry were de-politicising the planning process (“produce a 30 year plan
that allows this city to make the right decisions no matter who is in power”), improving
transport planning (“the lack of a vision costs Sydney dearly”), and seeking community
involvement (“we encourage your participation. We know that together we can find a solution
that puts Sydney back on track”) (Fray 2009, p. 1). The Editorial (SMH 2009, p. 10) on the
day of the Inquiry launch said “The Rees Government has demonstrated that on transport
questions, it cannot plan for all citizens of the state equally. So ordinary citizens must take up
the task”.
The most obvious reason for the Inquiry may have been to boost or retain circulation and
readership by meeting readers’ needs and interest in transport, and demonstrating
intellectual interest in its namesake city. The newspaper industry is under pressure, with
declining readership and increasing competition in content and advertising from new forms of
media. The Editor-in-Chief of The Sydney Morning Herald, Peter Fray, has commented that
“The Herald is the marketplace of ideas – about Sydney, about the shape of our lives, about
the future. Read, think and tell us your ideas” (Fray 2011, p. 2). But as the content analysis
below shows, the Herald's own reporting does not seem to be strongly consistent with this as
a primary motivation.
4.3 Who
The Independent Inquiry was chaired by Ron Christie AM, a former roads authority executive
and former NSW Coordinator-General of Rail and author of the Christie long term strategic
plan for rail. He was assisted by a team of nine transport professionals many of whom have
had a long involvement in Sydney’s transport as academics, public servants and/or
consultants. The members listed in the report in alphabetical order were: Dick Day (formerly
of RailCorp), Innes Ferguson (formerly of Transport for London), Garry Glazebrook
(University of Technology Sydney), Alex Gooding (consultant), Roderick Simpson
(consultant), Sandy Thomas (consultant), Jarrett Walker (consultant), Jim Wells (formerly of
RailCorp) and a person who chose to remain anonymous. The Inquiry (2010b, p. iv) noted
that “most members of this Inquiry team generously donated their time”. Herald journalist
Andrew West said at a pre-election public forum that the “Inquiry would have cost several
millions of dollars if the work had been paid for” (West 10 March 2011). The Inquiry also
commissioned reports from Allen Consulting Group on funding advice and from the
University of Technology Sydney Centre of the Study of Choice on market research into
community willingness to pay for transport.
4.4 How
The Inquiry was conducted in several stages and used five main approaches to obtain
community inputs (Inquiry 2010b, p. 55):
1. The Inquiry made a call for public submissions by 8 October 2009. The Inquiry received
490 formal submissions prior to the release of the Preliminary Report.
2. Immediately after the call for public submissions, the Inquiry held a series of public
meetings around the metropolitan area in Castle Hill, Liverpool, Parramatta, Kogarah,
Kensington, North Ryde, Dee Why and central Sydney (Inquiry 2010b, p. 2).
3. Follow-up meetings were held with individuals and groups making submissions,
particularly to discuss proposals of special interest.
4. Extensive public opinion research was conducted by independent consultants
commissioned by the Inquiry to guide the Inquiry’s identification of the most important
options for improvements and the community’s willingness to pay for these
improvements.
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5. A Preliminary Report was released on 13 February 2010 accompanied by reporting in the
Herald, and briefings of individuals and stakeholder groups. Public submissions were
sought on the Preliminary Report to prepare the Final Report.
The Inquiry had an aura of a “government inquiry”, being similar in having terms of reference,
seeking submissions and producing a draft report. The Inquiry created its own logo, which
closely resembled the NSW Government’s stylised logo of a waratah, and used the logo in
advertisements in The Sydney Morning Herald to attract submissions, similar to government
calls for consultation on inquiries and reviews. But as a non-government process, the Inquiry
had no formal powers.
4.5 The Inquiry's Themes and Recommendations
The Inquiry identified nine themes which consistently emerged in the submissions, in the
market research and through the Inquiry team, which were described as (Inquiry 2010b, p.
21):
• We have tried the “do nothing” option for public transport. It has failed.
• We need a complete public transport network plan and an agency that can deliver it.
• A three-legged stool: urban form, pricing and transport.
• Public transport, not just roads.
• The need for a single, seamless public transport network.
• Cost-effectiveness.
• Short-term urgency and continuous improvement.
• The need for long-term commitment, now.
• Leadership, transparency and consultation for the hard choices that will have to be made.
The 26 individual recommendations were summarised to be about the three key themes of
planning, funding and governance (Inquiry 2010a, 2010b).

5. Impact and influence of the Inquiry
Was the Herald aiming to create new social capital with the hope that it would generate its
own returns? Did the Herald fear that promoting its report in a traditional way might somehow
sully the returns that new social capital might generate? Or was the Herald trying to achieve
multiple aims, i.e. generating content and readership on the one hand but also seeking to
establish a network that would live beyond the release of the final report, ready to contribute
once government institutions were ready to act and implement again.
We argue that the Herald took a lead in creating a policy network and created a policy plan
based on that network. To come to this conclusion, we assess the impact and influence of the
Inquiry in two ways using publicly available sources: impact on the Herald including
contribution to content in the Herald, and external impact on government transport planning.

5.1 Assessing the Herald’s motivation: Contribution to Herald content
The contribution of the Inquiry to content in The Sydney Morning Herald is assessed through
contribution to total items, total words, page 1 articles, editorials and other content, and
through the timing of content relative to the announcement in August 2009, the Preliminary
Report in February 2010, the Final Report in May 2010, and after the Final Report. The
Sydney
Morning
Herald
online
archive
of
articles
(http://newsstore.smh.com.au/apps/newsSearch.ac) was searched to identify and extract all
items about the Inquiry by using the search terms “Christie”, “transportpublicinquiry” (which
was the Inquiry’s website address), “independent inquiry” and “transport”, and checking all
articles containing “public transport” as a final check. Items included articles, editorials, letters
to the Editor and opinion pieces in the Herald and its sister publication the Sun-Herald. For
each item, the information extracted included the full text, author, word count, page number
and newspaper (Sydney Morning Herald or Sun-Herald). The search was restricted to the
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News and Features section of the paper. The time period for the search was the month the
Inquiry was announced to after the NSW state election on 26 March 2011 (1 August 2009 to
31 March 2011), a total of 20 months.
Timing of content in Herald
Table 1 shows that, over 20 months, the Inquiry generated a total of 111 items made up of 61
articles with over 33,000 total words including 10 page 1 articles in the Herald, as well as
eight editorials and 37 letters to the Editor, and six items in the sister publication The SunHerald. The Herald wrote articles about the Inquiry itself, reported on the community
meetings, reported on submissions to the Inquiry, and also linked the Inquiry to other articles
on transport in Sydney by including Inquiry details and forum details at the end of articles
about transport.
Table 1 Number of items and total words referring to the Inquiry in The Sydney Morning Herald
and Sun-Herald (August 2009-March 2011)

Item
Article
Editorial
Letter
Opinion
Total
items

After
Final

(31 MayJun 2010)

(Jul 2010Mar 2011)

No.
(Words)
1
(172)

No.
(Words)
6
(3,222)

No.
(Words)
3
(1,320)

1
(824)

1
(429)

Total

Process
(Sept 2009Jan 2010)

(Feb 2010)

(Mar-28
May 2010)

No.
(Words)
11
(8,273)

No.
(Words)
19
(8,336)

No.
(Words)
21
(12,092)

1
(740)

1
(424)

4
(2,398)

11
(1,227)

4
449)

21
(2,196)

1
(155)

37
(4,027)

3
(1,678)

1
(1,455)

5
(3,466)

5
(2,930)

111
(45,723)

1
(333)
24
(10,573)

24
(9,209)

Draft
Report

Final
Report

Launch
(Aug 2009)

49
(18,364)

After Draft

2
(996)

7
(3,651)

(Aug 2009–
Mar 2011)

No.
(Words)
61
(33,415)
8
(4,815)

Notes: Items in News and Features section.

In terms of timing, the Inquiry’s major contribution to Herald content was at the time of the
release of the Preliminary Report in February 2010 with 49 items totalling 18,364 words. Of
the six items in the Sun-Herald, four occurred with the Preliminary Report release. The
second largest batch of items came during the initial launch of the Inquiry itself in August
2009 (24 items totalling 10,573 words). This timing is consistent with the traditional role of a
newspaper to generate content and report and disseminate that content, although in this
case the paper itself was ‘creating’ the news through the Inquiry. The equal second largest
batch of items was after the launch and before the Preliminary Report when the Inquiry
process was reported on in September and October 2009. At 24 items including 19 articles
and 9,209 words, nearly as much space was devoted to the process as to the initial launch.
More surprising is the paucity of coverage of the Final Report itself. The release in May 2010
generated only seven items (totalling 3,651 words), in late May 2010 and the first two weeks
of June and there have been only five items in the nine months since then which included the
lead-up to the NSW state election in March 2011.
Over half the articles (38 out of 61) were by Andrew West, the Transport Reporter as primary
author, with another three articles as second author, although 12 different Herald journalists
wrote about the Inquiry.
The content analysis is broad and not definitive but suggests that the Inquiry and the
readership and content associated with it was not the only aim of the Herald in producing it.
Why was there no large spike in coverage once the Final Report was issued? And why was
there no spate of follow-up reporting, even negative reporting, showing how government was
failing to take up these community-based ideas?
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To illustrate the potential opportunities for the Herald to include the Inquiry in its content,
Table 2 summarises items on “transport”, “public transport”, and about the Inquiry each
month in the Herald. The Sun-Herald is excluded due to the low number of articles about the
Inquiry. Table 2 shows that, of the 721 articles in the News and Features section containing
the words “public transport” over 20 months, only 15% referred to the Herald’s Inquiry. Even
this overstates the references to the Inquiry as each letter to the Editor on the Inquiry was
counted individually in the Inquiry column in Table 2, but included as one item (if published
under the same heading in the online archive) in the “public transport” column in Table 2. The
high percentages in August 2009 and February 2010 are largely due to the letters the Herald
chose to publish, as shown in Table 1. Many of the “public transport” articles in the Herald
were about the themes of planning, governance and funding covered in the Inquiry including
the metro rail project, federal government funding, and the development of the NSW
government’s Transport Blueprint. However, few of these articles referred to the Inquiry,
despite the opportunity.
Once again, this analysis shows that the Herald was restrained in referring to its own Inquiry.
There are limitations to this data analysis, as the notes to Table 2 explain, but the illustrative
order of magnitude shows that even considering the Herald's broader public transport
coverage, its own Inquiry did not dominate its columns in most cases. Content-driven
readership gains were apparently not the only hoped for (and perhaps not even the primary)
objective.
Table 2 Illustrative summary of items on transport, public transport and the Inquiry in The
Sydney Morning Herald by month (August 2009-March 2011)

Month
August 2009
September 2009
October 2009
November 2009
December 2009
January 2010
February 2010
March 2010
April 2010
May 2010
June 2010
July 2010
August 2010
September 2010
October 2010
November 2010
December 2010
January 2011
February 2011
March 2011
Total: Aug 2009-Mar 2011

Items
containing
1
“Transport”
98
114
109
87
128
88
148
96
86
101
91
94
88
107
68
94
88
60
133
166
2,044

Items
containing
2
“Public transport”
41
51
34
26
36
25
75
29
23
30
28
32
33
37
29
26
34
23
46
63
721

Items
on
3
Inquiry
23
20
3
1
0
0
45
1
0
5
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
105

Inquiry items as
% of “public
transport” items
56%
39%
9%
4%
0%
0%
60%
3%
0%
17%
7%
0%
3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
4%
2%
3%
15%

1

Items containing “transport” includes articles about freight and transport internationally, and transport as a verb.
Items containing “public transport” includes articles about public transport in other cities or countries. Articles
about specific types of public transport (buses, light rail) may not include the phrase “public transport”.
3
As reported in Table 1 (excluding The Sun-Herald).
2

Inquiry extension: Hunter Independent Public Transport Study
The Newcastle Herald, also a Fairfax media publication, announced on 10 November 2010
that it was holding its own version of the Sydney Inquiry for the Hunter region. This suggests
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that the media company thought the concept was valuable in achieving its objectives, and
that sufficient local eminent transport professionals thought it would be a useful and valuable
exercise to agree to serve on the Steering Committee and Advisory Panel. The Hunter
Inquiry was similar to the Inquiry for Sydney in aim (“aimed at ending the politicised approach
to planning”); the team with a Steering Committee and Advisory Panel of experts, including
experts who worked on the Sydney Inquiry; and approach with public forums and public
submission (Harris 2010). It published a discussion paper in November 2010 (Newcastle
Herald 2010). The Hunter Inquiry’s website was part of the Newcastle Herald’s site
(http://www.theherald.com.au/specialfeature.aspx?id=4154), not separate as for Sydney.
Herald Transport Forum
The Herald built on its expertise in transport generated by the Inquiry. In the lead up to the
NSW state election on 26 March 2011, the Herald organised, promoted and hosted a
Transport Forum on 10 March 2011 at Epping with the Minister for Transport, Shadow
Minister, Greens representative and three experts including a transport consultant who
worked for the Inquiry. The Forum was hosted by Herald journalist Andrew West. The Forum
generated a page 1 article the next day in the Herald.

5.2 External Impact: Transport planning
The impact of the Herald’s Inquiry on transport planning in NSW is unclear due to
discontinuity in governance in NSW and the short time since the Inquiry was completed. The
impact of the Inquiry on policy transfer is better assessed over the long-term. When Kristina
Keneally replaced Nathan Rees as NSW Premier on 4 December 2009, Premier Rees had
been about to release his comprehensive Transport Blueprint the day before. The Transport
Blueprint was discarded, and the new Premier began drafting her own transport plan. The
Herald reported that Premier Keneally said of the Inquiry’s Preliminary Report: “We read it
with great interest and I will be asking both treasury and transport to evaluate the inquiry's
plan and provide us with their views and feedback on it” (Hall and Moore, 15 February 2010,
p. 1). The NSW Government released its own Metropolitan Transport Plan two weeks later
on 21 February 2010 (NSW Government 2010b).
Contrasts between the Independent Inquiry and the Metropolitan Transport Plan are
summarised in Table 3. A major difference is the comprehensiveness of the plans, with the
Inquiry Report being for a longer time period and more detailed. In terms of public transport
projects, the major difference between the plans is the priority of the North West Rail Link
project. In terms of governance structures for transport planning, John Robertson became
the new Minister for Transport in May 2010, and in June, announced a restructure of the
transport department with NSW Transport and Infrastructure to become Transport NSW
(Robertson 2010). The Minister said “the new agency Transport NSW will integrate the
operation and planning of all modes of transport including trains, buses, ferries, cars and
bicycles” (Robertson 2010). This was a response to increasing calls for integration from
many stakeholders including the Herald’s Inquiry, as well as a continuation of the integration
started in June 2009 with Premier Rees’ announcement of super-departments.
The impact of the Independent Inquiry on the (then) Opposition’s transport plans is also
unclear. In the lead-up to the state election in March 2011, the Opposition made the North
West Rail Link and South West Rail Link its highest public transport priorities, before the
Parramatta-Epping Rail Link. The (then) Opposition supported an integrated public transport
agency. Following the election of the O’Farrell Liberal/National government on 26 March
2011, Transport NSW is being restructured as an integrated transport authority, Infrastructure
NSW is being created to develop long-term plans and prioritise projects, and work on the
North West Rail Link is progressing as a priority. The O’Farrell government has not yet
expressed a clear view on funding for transport.
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Table 3 Comparison of Independent Inquiry and NSW Government transport plans
Process

SMH Independent Inquiry:
Long Term Public Transport Plan

NSW Government:
Metropolitan Transport Plan

Date of release

13 February 2010 (preliminary report)
31 May 2010 (final report)

21 February 2010

Size

527 pages

45 pages

Timeframe

25 years

10 years

Team

Ron Christie, with (mostly) voluntary
team of transport professionals

Led by Dept of Premier and Cabinet

Community

Extensive submissions
Market research on Willingness to Pay

No evidence of consultation before
release

Funding

New funding sources proposed

$50 billion fully-funded plan over 10
years

Governance

Proposal for new Transport for Sydney
body

New integrated structure of Transport
NSW announced in June 2010

Projects – heavy rail

Support for North West Rail Link
Continue South West Rail Link
Plan for Merrylands-Parramatta-Epping
Rail

Western Sydney Express Line/City
Relief Line before NWRL
Complete NWRL in 2024

Projects – metro rail

Support only after heavy rail network
complete

Cancelled CBD Metro project

Projects – light rail

Extension of light rail into CBD

Announced light rail extension to
Dulwich Hill

Projects – buses

Network planning reforms

Growth buses including Metrobuses

Fares

Integrated and simplified fares system
with no interchange penalty

Government announced MyZone fare
reform in January/February 2010, for
implementation in April 2010

Land use

Support for integrated transport and land
use (“European” vs “East Asian”
scenarios)

Support for integrated transport and
land use

Content

6. Conclusions
The Sydney Morning Herald's Independent Inquiry to produce a long term public transport
plan for Sydney was a major effort that involved a complex and relatively long process of
civic engagement. This paper argues that the Inquiry constitutes an example of policynetwork and social capital building led by a major media institution. This appears to be a
unique case, both in policy development generally and in transport planning and policy in
particular.
Media advocacy in a policy arena is quite common both in terms of stakeholders (including
government) using media to argue their case in the public eye and in terms of media
institutions themselves attempting to influence policy by taking positions through editorials or
public information campaigns. The Herald Inquiry could be seen in this light, especially since
it built on earlier work in strategic transport planning by the non-government sector and this
area has seen much public debate in Sydney. Additionally, newspapers rely on readership
growth and content creation to attract that readership. Urban transport is certainly an issue of
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great interest to the public and the Herald could be seen as using the issue to maintain or
increase its circulation.
It is very likely that there was more than one motivation behind the Inquiry. But if the intent
was simply to generate content, interest and sales, the process adopted for doing this,
including getting reader submissions, holding numerous forums, doing community surveys,
engaging experts, and issuing a preliminary report for comment and feedback, appears to be
an inefficient and resource-intensive way of achieving that goal. It would have been faster, for
example, to pay a consultant to prepare the report and then promote it, if the Herald editors
only wanted transport planning and policy content to sell. This suggests that engaging the
community and building a social network was an important desired outcome of Herald
publishers.
Moreover the process itself seemed to be more the point at times than the actual product
generated, the Preliminary and Final Reports. The Herald reported on the process, but after
the Final Report was issued, its coverage of its own Inquiry fell off dramatically. In particular,
the reporting which many newspapers engage in after sponsoring some kind of investigation,
typically consisting of noting government failure to respond and ‘keeping up the pressure’ to
prod government into action, was largely not engaged in once the final report was released.
Perhaps, then, the Inquiry process was more about returns to a social capital invested in by
the newspaper than generating saleable content.
The process engaged in by the Herald resembles less a standard press reporting campaign
and more a government process, which suggests that the Inquiry was designed to fill a policy
vacuum created by government failure to deliver in this area. Strategic public transport
planning in Sydney, traditionally a State-centred policy network, was not functioning and the
Herald appears to have re-engaged and re-mobilised at least part of that network to produce
what such networks are supposed to produce: a social capital that generates policy returns.
One empirical indication that the policy vacuum was an important element is the Herald's
own coverage of its own initiative. If the process was about generating content to fill
newspaper space, the analysis conducted shows that it was a missed opportunity on their
part. The Herald reported much less than it could have on either its process or product,
something it would have pursued aggressively if the effort had just been about selling
newspapers.
There are other questions not answerable by public sources such as whether the final Inquiry
report fully reflected the inputs such as the public submissions generated by the process. It is
not known how many of the written submissions were incorporated into the
recommendations and how many were left out. It is also not clear what biases there might
have been in the process – whether some key experts and stakeholders were not invited to
participate, or chose not to participate, or how their inputs may have been filtered.
If this process was about social capital building and an associated policy transfer, as argued
here, it will take a longer timeframe to evaluate its effectiveness. The change of government
in NSW in March 2011 complicates interpretation of the impact on government policy due to
discontinuity in governance. But discontinuity in governance and its impact on transport
planning and implementation, even without a change in government, was the reason for
initiating an independent process to produce a long term public transport plan for Sydney.
This preliminary, systematic view of the Inquiry, using the publicly available source of content
in the Herald, illustrates a good example of how community institutions, in this case a
newspaper The Sydney Morning Herald, can respond to blockages in policy institutions and
networks and in the making of policy.
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